Photo by Ezra Shaw/Getty Images
Defenses and defensive coordinators get paid too
Ahead of Super Bowl LIII, Bill Belichick and Brian Flores had a task to complete.
That task? Crafting a defensive game plan that would give the New England Patriots a chance to slow down the explosive Los Angeles Rams offense, a unit that ranked second in the NFL with an average of 32.9 points per game. That included slowing down Jared Goff, who threw for 32 touchdowns and ranked sixth in the NFL with an Adjusted Net Yards per Attempt of 7.69 that season.
Their plan?
Part of it involved making Goff think as much as possible.
As outlined by Albert Breer and others following Super Bowl LIII the Patriots “essentially sent in two calls on every [defensive] play. One was what they’d show before the snap. The other was what they’d switch into post-snap. And if you want to see how it worked, go back and watch how Goff held the ball, and doubted what he was looking at, over and over and over.”
The plan worked, and perhaps the best example came in the second half when Goff had a chance for the game’s first big play, when Brandin Cooks was open in the middle of the field but Goff hesitated, allowing cornerback Jason McCourty to recover and break up the late throw.
Now, fast-forward to Sunday’s NFC Championship Game between Goff and his new team the Detroit Lions, and the San Francisco 49ers.
After Goff and the Lions stormed out to a 24-7 halftime lead, San Francisco fought back to tie the game at 24, thanks to four minutes of game time that may haunt the Lions and their fans forever. Then after a Detroit three-and-out, the 49ers took the lead on a Jake Moody field goal.
Detroit finally got something going on offense on their following possession, but the drive slowed in San Francisco territory. Facing a 4th-and-3 situation at the 49ers’ 30-yard line Dan Campbell, as he has done all season long, left his offense on the field.
The merits of going for this fourth down, as opposed to trying the 48-yard field goal to just get points on the board, will be debated for a long time. But now let’s focus on how defensive coordinator Steve Wilks baited Goff before the snap, and how the 49ers’ defense forced an incompletion in a critical spot.
We start with this image:
The Lions break the huddle with 11 offensive personnel on the field — three wide receivers, one tight end, and one running back — and Goff is alone in the backfield. Jahmyr Gibbs, the explosive rookie RB, is the lone running back in the game and he is aligned along the right sideline, at the top of the screen. Goff scans the defense and seeing linebacker Dre Greenlaw walking towards the sideline, he makes an adjustment, calling Gibbs into the slot.
Why? Because everything Goff has seen to this point is telling him the Lions are in man coverage, including seeing a linebacker walk outside to cover Gibbs along the sideline. Goff points to his helmet and changes the play, bringing Gibbs into the slot. Greenlaw again follows the RB:
Again, everything is telling Goff the 49ers are in man coverage. Look at the alignment of the defensive backs. You see two safeties deep, and the other DBs are in man coverage alignments, feet parallel to the line of scrimmage, locked in on the receiver across from them.
This screams to Goff that the 49ers are in man coverage.
So what did he change the play to? As Greg Olsen — who really does a very good job — noted on the FOX Sports broadcast, the Lions end up running a mesh concept, which is an ideal route concept to beat man coverage. Speedy wide receiver Jameson Williams and rookie tight end Sam LaPorta are going to run the shallow crossers underneath, hoping to create traffic to spring one of them free. Gibbs releases to the right flat, while Josh Reynolds, who is aligned wide to the left, runs the deep dig. Amon-Ra St. Brown, aligned in the slot on the left, will run a sit route, finding space over the football. The sit route is an outlet if the defense happens to be in zone coverage.
But given the fact that everything is screaming man coverage, that won’t be needed, right?
Wrong.
As Olsen noted in real time, the 49ers drop into zone coverage here, so instead of the underneath defenders trying to chase the crossers in man, this is what Goff sees shortly after the snap:
The only traffic that gets created here is the cluster of three Detroit receivers over the middle of the field. If you look at the two crossing routes — one from Williams working to the left and then LaPorta working to the right — there is a zone defender awaiting both players. Logan Ryan, who initially aligned over St. Brown, is sitting on the hashmark just waiting for Williams while Greenlaw (who started this who series of events) is just outside the right hashmark, waiting for LaPorta to come to him.
Now, Goff still has a chance to make something of this play, thanks to the route from St. Brown. Again, the Lions are running mesh-sit, a design which still gives QBs a chance to make something happen should the defense be in zone. St. Brown will “sit” over the football, finding grass between the underneath zone defenders.
But there is just one problem. As the receiver starts to sit down on his route, the pocket collapses, and Goff has to bail:
As you can see, St. Brown is looking into the backfield to pick up his QB, but the left side of the line has broken. Goff is now in flight mode, so St. Brown trails him in a scramble drill.
Goff eventually tries to connect with St. Brown, but the pass falls incomplete. Here is the whole play, starting with the initial alignment, the check and adjustment from Goff, and the incompletion itself:
Offenses can use things like motion and alignment to give the quarterback information before the snap, and indications regarding the coverage and potential blitz packages. However, defenses are not simply playing along, and defensive coordinators have done a really good job in recent years at showing the quarterback one look in response to motion or a particular formation, but then changing their own play call to cloud the picture.
Here, the 49ers show Goff man coverage presnap, he makes an adjustment, but the 49ers are in fact running zone, and Goff is forced to recalibrate his presnap expectations with the postsnap reality. Add in some pressure off the edge, and you have a failed fourth-down attempt.
Of course, much will be made about the decision to go for the fourth down to begin with. But once that was made, it was up to the players to execute the plays that were called.
And on this snap, Steve Wilks and the 49ers got the job done.
