Luka Dončić and Kyrie Irving may be the most scheme-proof backcourt in NBA history

Photo by Glenn James/NBAE via Getty Images

Teams have thrown every coverage that exists toward their way. It hasn’t mattered.

If there was proof behind the assertion that there is complication to the uncomplicated, look no further than what the Dallas Mavericks decided to run as their first play of the second half of Game 5. Despite a commanding 69-40 lead and vulnerable to resting on their laurels, their unabated hunger for excellence meant there was no room for stepping off the accelerator.

The simplicity of the double drag concept can somewhat belie how complex and difficult it can be to stop it, especially when an extremely skilled pick-and-roll operator is the one pulling the strings. To puppeteer an offense and manipulate a defense requires deft touch and a sharp mind — both of which Luka Dončić possesses.

It’s a no brainer to let someone who has both pick-and-roll volume (740 possessions as the ball handler in such play types — second only to Jalen Brunson during the regular season) and efficiency (1.07 points per possession in the pick-and-roll — fifth among 71 players who tallied a minimum 200 possessions as the pick-and-roll ball handler) be the triggerman and focal point of a double ball screen setup. The Mavs pushed that button over and over, forcing the Minnesota Timberwolves to adjust and step well outside of their comfort zone.

The Wolves teetered between the brink of survival and extinction — almost as much as they teetered between pick-and-roll coverages. After not being comfortable switching the likes of Mike Conley and Karl-Anthony Towns around the first double-drag screen, they relented and let Conley switch onto Dončić — and then returned to not being comfortable with those kinds of switches.

The concept of “hedge-and-recover” was applied whenever Conley or Towns was targeted in ball-screen action. It entails the screener’s defender (Conley or Towns) taking a few steps toward the ball handler to jump out and force him away from the screen — which is done in order for the initial on-ball defender to recover toward the ball handler, after which the hedger makes his own recovery toward his original assignment (the screener).

Insanity is often doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result — but if the Wolves’ insistence on hedging Conley in double drag action could be considered insane, it was born out of a paradoxical desire to keep things under control.

In the Mavs’ case, the repetitive nature of insanity refers to a dare they presented to the Wolves’ defense: We will keep doing something over and over until you find a way to stop it. In that regard, the simple double drag action and its variants were part of their goal to make the Wolves crumble under the sensation of déjà vu.

“Finland” action is an example of a variant: double drag screens with the additional component of a “rip” screen (i.e., back screen) by a capable movement shooter for the first drag screener, after which the back screener comes off of an away screen by the second drag screener. The Mavs ran it to maximum effect in Game 2; they unfurled it again in Game 5 to open the third quarter.

Recognizing the double drag action coming — and Towns being the man targeted around the first screen — Towns subscribed to the hedge-and-recover scheme that was anti-switch, and therefore, anti-advantage. But while it may look like a run-of-the-mill double drag, the Mavs once again succeeded in ensnaring the Wolves behind a facade of simplicity:

Towns’ aggressive hedge — and Anthony Edwards choosing to recover toward Dončić — creates a numbers advantage for the Mavs, courtesy of an unchecked PJ Washington darting his way toward the rim. The unexpected nature of Washington’s cut catches Rudy Gobert unawares; he is unable to get back in time to prevent the Dončić-Washington connection.

Daring the Wolves to stop “Finland,” the Mavs ran it again a couple of possessions later. Wary of what happened the last time around, Gobert takes a preventative measure to make sure that Washington doesn’t shake loose for another lob opportunity. But Dončić eschews that option and strolls his way toward a high-percentage floater (he shot 53% during the regular season in the short midrange area — 98th percentile among point guards, per Cleaning The Glass):

The possession above is the essence of what makes Dončić an anomaly. There is no coverage that can truly stop him in his tracks — an unstoppable force to which no immovable object exists. While the Wolves’ defense was uncharacteristically foolhardy and disorganized, one can’t blame them for a lack of imagination and experimentation.

The Wolves tried every coverage there is known to man against Dončić and his backcourt partner in Kyrie Irving. Defending Dončić in single coverage and choosing to play a conservative drop — in their efforts to minimize being put in rotation (with the occasional exception allowed for nail help from the wings) and reduce his teammates’ three-point opportunities — was blown away by Dončić’s shot-making exploits.

Not to be outdone by his backcourt partner — yet careful enough not to step on the toes of the certified franchise player and certainly not on the same level of being scheme-proof as Dončić — Irving proved to be equally adept at making shots and being scheme-resistant enough to make most coverages moot.

Their individuality doesn’t come at the expense of the collective. The way their advantage creation uplifts their teammates’ abilities and upgrades their shot quality is what defines their ability to be offensive focal points. But there is much to be discussed about how each of them benefits from the other’s presence on the floor.

In that regard, it becomes exponentially more difficult to play aggressive coverages against them — especially against Dončić. Sending an extra body without a screen to trigger the help makes Irving’s job on offense easier, while simultaneously lifting the burden off of Dončić’s shoulders:

In the same vein, having Dončić be one pass away on the wing while Irving is the beneficiary of a ball screen makes gap or “nail” help — the nail referring to the area of the floor approximating the middle of the free throw line — a choice between two poisons: letting Irving touch the paint and collapsing the defense, or sending a third defender to plug the gap while risking an open Dončić on the wing.

The latter was the scenario the Wolves chose — to their detriment:

In an environment where the your-turn-my-turn discourse typically breeds doubt and pessimism, Dončić and Irving taking turns eviscerating the league’s best defense made believers out of even the most ardent skeptics. Granted, they weren’t alone in their efforts — having spacing, above-the-rim threats, and two-way competency surrounding them certainly did its fair share of getting them to this point.

The rest of the team wholeheartedly accepted the approach of their two superstars. An offense unburdened by complication, excelling in simplicity, and embracing a direct approach gave the Wolves plenty of complicated suffering. As Dončić and Irving prepare to fly to Boston to face a looming monster in the East, it remains to be seen if the Celtics will also succumb to the same fate.