Why Trail Blazers fans should hope Scoot Henderson is like Baron Davis

Photo by Rocky Widner/NBAE via Getty Images

Deep diving into Baron Davis can inform our expectations for Scoot Henderson

With the Damian Lillard trade saga having finally come to a resolution, the attention in Portland now shifts squarely onto the broad shoulders of soon-to-be rookie point guard Scoot Henderson.

As the third overall pick, Henderson (along with Shaedan Sharpe, Anfernee Simons, and now, Deandre Ayton) will be tasked with ushering the Portland Trail Blazers into their next era of basketball. But just how good can Henderson hope to be?

One comparison that has been floating around is Baron Davis. And while player comparisons often lose some nuance, they can be a helpful barometer for projecting a player’s long-term potential. Admittedly, I have watched very little Henderson tape up to this point. However, I have spent the last handful of weeks studying the game of his predecessor. And after examining him closely, I can confidently say that Henderson evolving into a modern-day Davis would be a wonderful outcome for the Blazers.

[Sidebar #1: Davis struggled with injuries for much of his career, which limited his longevity. As a result, when we say that fans should hope Henderson is like Davis, we are referring to his peak.]

Like Henderson right now, Davis was never a particularly good shooter. He wasn’t a timid shooter. Quite the contrary, he enjoyed nothing more than hoisting pull-up twos and threes (when you think about it, he was kind of ahead of his time for shooting so many of the latter). But he just wasn’t that effective at converting on those looks. A quick look at his shooting accuracy will tell you all you need to know.

Cleaning the Glass
Baron Davis Shooting Accuracy 2003-12 (relative to position)*

A whole lot of blue and not a lot of orange. That’s a Cleaning the Glass recipe for an efficiency disaster. And that’s the reason why his scoring efficiency (measured by True Shooting) was never at or above league average during any season of his career (kind of like Antoine Walker).

[Sidebar #2: The only sustained stretch of positive efficiency comes in the form of his rim-finishing during his time with the Golden State Warriors (05-08). The key ingredient to his success during that time was spacing. With Charlotte/New Orleans, Davis was straddled on teams with little to no outside shooting other than himself (only once in 5.5 years did they finish higher than 15th in three-pointers made). That led to massive amounts of congestion in the paint. Juxtapose that with his 3.5-year tenure with Golden State (finished top-5 in makes every year during his tenure), where he was consistently afforded the opportunity to drive in the lane without being impeded by rush hour traffic.]

Although he was oftentimes inefficient around the rim, Davis made it a point to get downhill as much as possible. In 2006-07, he finished in the 91st percentile in rim frequency among point guards. His ability to consistently get two feet in the paint led to successful team offense for multiple reasons.

First, a shot at the rim created by an inefficient finisher is still a relatively efficient shot overall. Davis shot 55 percent at the rim during the 2003-04 season (per Cleaning the Glass). That’s the same level of efficiency as a midrange shot taken by a 55 percent shooter (for reference, midrange master DeMar DeRozan shot just 48 percent from midrange last season) or a three-pointer taken by a 36.5 percent three-point shooter (league average in 2022-23 was 36.1 percent). So, even during his poor rim-finishing seasons, Davis was generating shots that were more efficient than most midrange and three-point attempts.

Second, getting to the rim a ton means you have a better chance of generating free throws. And Davis was no statistical anomaly in this category. In 2006-07, he finished in the 85th percentile in free throw attempts per 100 possessions (8 FTA per 100). Even for a mediocre free throw shooter like Davis (career 71.1 percent shooter), that’s still at least a 70+ percent two-point shot he’s consistently creating (the equivalent of a 46.7 percent three-point shooter taking a three).

Last but certainly not least, generating paint touches means that you are collapsing defenses and creating open looks for your teammates. This was arguably Davis’ greatest skill as an offensive player.

As the old adage goes, the shots you create for yourself will never be as efficient as the ones you create for others. And in Davis’ case, he was able to leverage his tools (speed, strength, and handle) to create advantages for his teammates to capitalize on. According to Ben Taylor’s Box Creation measure (a statistic that estimates shots created for teammates per 100 possessions), Davis finished in the 90th percentile or higher in playmaking every year from 2001 to 2010. The best part is that most of the shots he was creating were layups and three-pointers (the most efficient assisted shots in the game).

Davis, like many of the great players in league history, also loved to play in transition. He was great at playing the role of fastbreak initiator or finisher. But one skill that he mastered that often gets overlooked (because we don’t really have a statistic to quantify it) is the hit-ahead pass.

Notice how, in all the clips included above, Davis immediately pushes the pace with a pass – regardless of whether his defense is coming off a make (first clip), miss (second), or turnover (third). As a general rule, transition offense is the most efficient live-ball offense you’re going to get. So, having players who can unlock transition possessions in any situation is a huge boon for your team’s global offense.

Rim pressure, playmaking, and the ability to play with pace – all these attributes bear resemblance to someone like Ja Morant. But unlike Morant, who spends his defensive possessions struggling to stay afloat, Davis hardly gets picked on at that end of the court. In fact, during his heyday, he was a clear positive defender.

When you’re a guard, especially one with a high on-ball load, being a good defender isn’t a necessity. But when you can be a good defender on top of your offensive duties, it makes building a high-level team around you a whole lot easier (because then you can have a weaker defender at a different position).

As a two-time steals champion (2003-04 and 2006-07), a large portion of Davis’ defensive value was derived from his play-killing powers. While we don’t have an official measurement of his wingspan, his length was on full display whenever he was on the court. And he leveraged that and his accurate hands to poke the ball free when he would dig on drives or to intercept passes when he was playing the role of free safety.

Overall, he spent four of six seasons from 2003 to 2008 in the 88th percentile or higher in steal rate (for his position). When you’re a guard, you generally can’t move the needle as a rim protector, so the next best thing you can do is be a defensive playmaker. After all, the other team has exactly a zero percent chance of scoring on possessions where they turn the ball over.

And while he wasn’t Rudy Gobert in the paint doesn’t mean he wasn’t providing some rim protection for his position. He was in the 73rd percentile or higher in block rate among guards every year from 2005 to 2010. On top of that, he was a talented defensive rebounder, finishing in the 70th percentile in field goal defensive rebounding percentage (fgDR%) every year from 2005-09.

He wasn’t always the most consistent on-ball defender. A combination of injuries and a high workload (he averaged over 37.8 minutes per game five times in his career) led to him being a bit stiff at the point of attack at times. However, despite his occasional matador moments, opponents rarely ever tried to hunt him on defense (unless he was visibly hurt). And when he was really locked in, he was able to harness his combination of strength and agility to put the best perimeter defenders of the aughts in handcuffs. The following montage includes clips of him defending Dwayne Wade, Jason Kidd, Tony Parker, and Manu Ginobili.

Davis wasn’t an All-League caliber defender, but given his offensive contributions, he didn’t need to be. The very fact that he was at least a good defender put him in a different class than most on-ball point guards.

In the end, Davis never played on a truly great team. But from watching him play and looking at his statistical footprint, that was no fault of his own. According to Cleaning the Glass on/off data, every team Davis played for from 2003 to 2008 was significantly better when he was on the floor as opposed to when he was off it. His best season came in 2006-07 (the year of the “We Believe Warriors”) when Golden State was 11.8 points better per 100 possessions when Davis was on the floor (98th percentile in the entire league).

What’s more, is that most of this positive value actually came from his offense. In every season from 2003 to 2008, Davis finished in the 86th percentile or higher in offensive on/off. In a small sample size during 2004-05 (986 minutes) he was even able to guide the Warriors to a 114.2 Offensive Rating in his minutes on the floor (98th percentile). So, even though he himself was an inefficient scorer, his rim pressure, creation for others, and unquenchable thirst for transition helped him quarterback high-end offenses.

All this is to say that Davis was a damn good player. The kind of player you could win with (if you put the right pieces around him). And so, if Henderson can ever reach a Baron Davis-level peak, that would be a huge win for the Blazers.